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Moral Rights and Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act: Oasis or Illusion?
by LAmy E. VERBIT*t
Introduction
The City of Pittsburgh wants to paint a sculpture a different
color. Wall murals created for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics
are in danger of being painted over or sandblasted. Elsewhere
in Hollywood, a script is changed or a film is edited by someone
other than its creator. Under American law, what rights can
the creator of each of these works assert to prevent the altera-
tion or misrepresentation of his work? Historically, American
common law has not recognized such rights. Yet in recent
years, artists have turned to the law of unfair competition as a
possible source of protection. This article examines the devel-
opment of American unfair competition law as applied to the
moral rights of paternity and integrity in an artist's work.
Protection of an artist's work from unconsented alteration
and protection from false attribution are two rights originating
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from the European doctrine of droit moral.' Droit moral is
known in the United States as moral rights. This article will
limit its consideration to the two moral rights of paternity and
integrity. The right of paternity has been defined as the "right
of the creator of a work to present himself before the public as
such, to require others so to present him, and to prevent others
from attributing works to him which he has not devised.' '2 The
right of paternity thus protects the artist through proper attri-
bution of his work. The right of integrity has been termed "the
right to modify and prevent deformation," and, further, "as the
right to make any additions, suppressions and other modifica-
tions which the author may deem necessary in order to make
the work conform to the state of his intellectual convictions.1
3
This article argues that this definition of integrity also includes
the right to protect one's work from mutilation.
Although droit moral is followed in the majority of Euro-
pean countries and is incorporated in the Berne Convention,
4
the United States has never become a signatory to the Conven-
tion. Opposition to the droit moral concepts espoused in article
6 of the Berne Convention Treaty was "voiced most consist-
1. See Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right- A Study in the Law of Artists, Au-
thors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REv. 554 (1940). Droit moral protections may be
classified into four categories: "1) The right of disclosure (divulgation); 2) The right
to withdraw or disavow; 3) The right of paternity, i.e., the right to have one's name
and authorship recognized; [and] 4) The right of integrity of the work of art." Sar-
raute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law,
16 AM. J. Comp. L. 465, 467 (1968).
2. Roeder, supra note 1, at 561-62.
3. Id. at 565.
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, amended, Additional Act and Declaration, May 4, 1896 (Paris), revised, Novem-
ber 13,1908 (Berlin), amended, Additional Protocol to the Revised Berne Convention
of 1908, Mar. 20, 1914 (Berne), revised, June 2, 1928 (Rome), revised, June 26, 1948
(Brussels), revised, July 14, 1967 (Stockholm), cited in Comment, Moral Rights for
Artists Under the Lanham Act: Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 18 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 595, 597 n.19 (1977).
The Berne Convention is an international treaty organization which established
standards for protecting literary and artistic works. Article 6 of the Berne Conven-
tion (on droit moral rights) provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim author-
ship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilitation or other modifi-
cation of, or other derogatory action in relation to said work, which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, June 26, 1948
(Brussels) art. 6(2), reprinted in 11 UNESCO Copyright 114 (1948), cited in Com-
ment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through Extension f
Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEO. L.J. 1539, 1540 n.7 (1972).
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ently by the motion picture producers and other large exploit-
ers of creative works."5 The broad concept of droit moral has
not been definitively recognized in the United States, either by
express case law or specific statutory promulgation.6 However,
in limited situations, courts have granted protection for an art-
ist's moral rights under the guise of such causes of action as
libel, defamation, breach of contract, privacy, and unfair com-
petition.7 Other courts in dicta have indicated their support for
causes of action which, in effect, would protect an artist's moral
rights.8 As evidenced by Granz v. Harris9 and subsequent
cases, discussed below, creative counsel have gained protection
for their clients' artistic rights by finding new labels for the
rights encompassed in droit moral.10
The interests that the concept of moral rights is intended to
protect are not within those otherwise covered by the Copy-
right Act."' The copyright statutes are designed to protect the
economic interest of the copyright owner, 2 whereas moral
5. Roeder, supra note 1, at 558 (citing Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Foreign Relations on Executive E, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1938)).
6. But see CAL. Cirv. CODE §§ 987,989 (West 1984); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW
§ 14.53 (McKinney 1984). The California Art Preservation Act recognizes that a
work of fine art is an expression of an artist's personality and subsequent destruction
or alteration of the work will result in harm to the artist's reputation. The New York
act recognizes that an artist may have a legal right to object to alteration, mutilation,
defacing or other modifications of his work. L.D. DUBOFF, THE DESKBOOK OF ART
LAW, Ch. XVIII-7(1977 & Supp. 1984).
7. See Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Implementing Moral Right Through
Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60 GEo. L.J. 1539, 1540 (1972). See
generally Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976); Granz v.
Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring) (concurrence indicating sup-
port for a § 43(a) claim); Follett v. New Am. Lbrary, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Prouty v. National Broadcasting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939) (common
law unfair competition can be grounds for a cause of action for misappropriation of
plaintiff's creation).
8. See generally Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 61-63; Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc.,
330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed infra text accompanying notes 147-53.
9. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
10. See Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act-A
Judicial Shell Game?, 48 GEo. WASH. L REv. 377, 381 (1980). See also Bauer, A Fed-
eral Law f Unfair Competition" What Should Be The Reach of Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671, 693 n.95 (1984). Since drolt moral rights are not
protected statutorily in the United States, it has been necessary for counsel to find
other legal concepts under which to label alleged infringement of clients' artistic
interests.
11. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-809 (1982).
12. See Comment, supra note 7, at 1542 & n17 and accompanying text. See also
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
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rights are directed at the protection of the creator's perpetual
personal interest in his creation, regardless of who owns the
proprietary interest in the work.'3 Since the United States does
not recognize moral rights in its European context,14 a copy-
right infringement claim is not available to an artist who does
not specifically retain the rights of paternity and integrity
upon transfer of title to the work through sale, contract, or
other means of ownership transfer.15 Artistic creations are
alienable property and freely transferable under the Copyright
Act. 6 At least one court has found that an artist has waived all
rights in his creation upon transfer of the copyright where
there is no express agreement to the contrary. 7
Under the present statutory scheme, implementation of a
moral rights doctrine in the United States would be in direct
conflict with the proprietary interests of the transferee pro-
tected by copyright laws. Although establishment of moral
rights laws would radically change copyright ownership inter-
ests"' and case law, its positive impact would simultaneously
recognize the creator's ongoing interests and the public's right
to enjoy the fruit of the artist's labor.
This article focuses on the means by which American courts
have used unfair competition law, as developed through the
common law and section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,'9 to protect
13. See Maslow, supra note 10, at 377.
14. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d at 24 (2nd Cir. 1976).
15. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 668 (9th Cir. 1954); Landon v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
16. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 201-05 (1982).
17. Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1954).
18. For example, one who owns title to a copyrighted work would no longer be
freely able to utilize the work, at least to the point of altering it in some way, without
being subject to potential claims by its creator.
19. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). This
section provides as follows:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any per-
son who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or
description or representation cause or procure the same to be transported or
used in commerce or deliver the same to any carrier to be transported or
used, shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business in the
locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said local-
ity is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
[Vol. 9:383
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droit moral paternity and integrity interests in lieu of formal
recognition of the doctrine of droit moral. Specifically, this ar-
ticle addresses how one may protect against unconsented alter-
ation or false attribution of one's work through the application
of section 43(a). The article reviews the limited case law2° on
this relatively novel section 43(a) cause of action.21 It also re-
views those cases, including earlier common law cases, in which
courts protected artists' rights using unfair competition. These
cases will then be analogized to selected situations drawn from
recent events in the entertainment industry which might have
given rise to a cause of action for unfair competition under sec-
tion 43(a).
I
Unfair Competition and Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act
In recent years, the law of unfair competition as promul-
gated in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act has been used by art-
ists to assert their rights of paternity and integrity.22 The basis
for such claims is found in both case law and statutory interpre-
tation.2 This section examines cases where an artist's pater-
See irfra text accompanying notes 50-53 for a discussion of section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.
20. The first case to hold specifically that a section 43(a) cause of action would
likely succeed on the merits was Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14
(2d Cir. 1976). On appeal by the plaintiffs for a preliminary injunction, the Second
Circuit held that § 43(a) exists to protect a plaintiff's right not to have his work
presented to the public in a distorted version and such acts should be recognized as
stating a cause of action under the statute. Id. at 24-25. But see i& at 26 (Gurfein, J.,
concurring). See i7fra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
21. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
22. See generally Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir.
1976), discussed infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text (Q 43(a), held to protect
against extensive editing of television broadcasts); Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213
F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed infira notes 61-63 and accompanying text (editing
theatrical films for television could result in sufficient changes in the film requiring
application of a § 43(a) remedy); Follett v. New Am. Library, 497 F. Supp. 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussed infra notes 122-42 and accompanying text) (Q 43(a) viola-
tion resulted from false attribution to an editor as author of a book); Geisel v. Poynter
Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed infra notes 86-102 and accom-
panying text (Q 43(a) held to serve as a remedy for false designation of origin).
23. See generally Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), discussed infra
notes 54-60 and accompanying text (a recording that was garbled, abbreviated and
clearly different from the original gave rise to an unfair competition claim); Jaeger v.
American Intl Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed infr notes
147-53 and accompanying text (although denying injunctive relief after balancing the
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nity and integrity rights have been protected under unfair
competition law and section 43(a), in the absence of an Ameri-
can droit moral.
A. Pre-Section 43(a) Case Law
The common law tort of unfair competition" was recognized
in the United States for more than one-half centurye before
the implementation of section 43(a) in 1946.1 Many wrongs
fell under the rubric of unfair competition, including trade-
mark infringement and misrepresentations concerning the
quality, nature, or source of goods.-" Thus, when one acted in a
manner misleading or injurious to one's competitors or the pub-
lic, a cause of action under common law unfair competition
would arise.
1. International News Service v. Associated Press
One of the earliest unfair competition cases, International
News Service v. Associated Press,ms involved an unfair competi-
tion claim grounded in a theory of misappropriation.2' The As-
hardships, the court found that mutilation and distortion of a creator's film is subject
to unfair competition claims); Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Co. 1966), discussed infra notes 73-83 and accompa-
nying text (prohibiting insertion of television commercials which would distort mate-
rially the mood or continuity of a film); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966), discussed infra notes 65-72 and
accompanying text (mutilation of a film resulting from extensive editing would give
rise to injunctive relief but no mutilation found).
24. Common law unfair competition consists of a broad range of claims. See infra
notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
25. Early landmark cases in which unfair competition was at issue include New
York & Rosendale Cement Co. v. Coplay Cement Co., 44 F. 277 (C.C.E.D., Pa. 1890)
(plaintiff claimed that defendant's use of the name "Anchor Rosendale Cement"
while not being located in Rosendale, N.Y. was "unfair and fraudulent competition");
American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 103 F. 281 (6th Cir. 1900) (plaintiff
claimed that while its product was made with aluminum, defendant's was made with
zinc but still called it aluminum, resulting in lost sales to plaintiff because consumers
wanting aluminum were being misled by defendant and thus defendant was depriving
plaintiff of his customers).
26. Section 43(a) was enacted in 1946 as "a response to numerous problems that
arose under the prior acts of 1905 and 1920." Bauer, supra note 10, at 679. For the
text of section 43(a), see supra note 19.
27. Bauer, supra note 10, at 673.
28. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
29. Misappropriation arises with the intentional appropriation of another's prop-
erty resulting in injury to the owner. In INS v. AP, the news articles appropriated by
INS were held to be 'quasi- property,' the appropriation of which injured AP through.
unfair competitition. Il at 236, 242-44.
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sociated Press (AP) sued to enjoin International News Service
(INS) from using AP news articles published in early editions
and posted in AP windows. INS subsequently sent the infor-
mation obtained from AP's articles to its own subscribers,
where the articles were printed in newspapers competing with
AP.30 The Court found that the product which was appropri-
ated, the news element, was not subject to copyright claims."'
The Court then questioned whether a property right existed in
news and whether the defendant's conduct in appropriating
the AP's printed and published releases for commercial use
constituted unfair competition in the trade.32 Finding that AP
had a "quasi-property" right in the news matter,3 generated as
a result of its business efforts, the Court determined that AP's
economic interest was entitled to protection from unfair com-
petition. In dicta, the Court reviewed factors which gave rise to
the wrong and commented on "the device of rewriting com-
plainant's news articles."'  The Court noted that:
The habitual failure to give credit to complainant for that
which is taken is significant. Indeed, the entire system of ap-
propriating complainant's news and transmitting it as a com-
mercial product to defendant's clients and patrons amounts to
a false representation to them and to their newspaper readers
that the news transmitted is the result of defendant's own in-
vestigation in the field.3
Although the Court dismissed copyright claims in the works
or in the matter misappropriated by INS, it did find a "quasi-
property" interest. 7 This "quasi-property" interest was an
economic proprietary interest, analogous to paternity in the
droit moral context, and it established for AP the standing nec-
essary to bring the unfair competition claim. The determina-
tion that a "quasi-property"/economic interest existed is
consistent with the American approach which recognizes eco-
nomic rights as opposed to moral rights. The Court's finding
of unfair competition was influenced by the fact that INS re-
30. Id, at 220-31.
31. Id. at 233-34.
32. Id. at 232.
33. Id. at 23.
34. Id. at 242.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
38. See upra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
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wrote many of the misappropriated articles. Today, under
statutory unfair competition section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,
false attributions and mutilation4° claims could be argued in
addition to misappropriation. However, it should be noted that
the interest asserted by the AP was not one of moral paternity
(because AP was not the actual writer of the news articles), but
what might more appropriately be termed economic paternity.
2. Prouty v. National Broadcasting Company
In another early case, Prouty v. National Broadcasting Com-
pany,4' the United States District Court for Massachusetts de-
nied the defendant's motion to dismiss, thus recognizing an
unfair competition claim based on misappropriation of charac-
ters and plots from plaintiff's literary creation. The plaintiff
was the author and copyright owner of an original novel enti-
tled Stella Dallas. The defendant broadcast a variety of "skits
as episodes in the life of... Stella Dallas in the character por-
trayed in said novel under that name and title."4 The essence
of the plaintiff's claim was that by creating such a program
and presenting it to the public without approval or consent, the
defendant had misappropriated the title Stella Dallas and the
plaintiff's rights therein, including her successful authorship
of the work. The plaintiff further alleged that the radio skits
were of inferior quality, thus degrading the artistic excellence
associated with the title of the novel and its quality so as to
"imperil the further sale of other works which the complainant
has written and is writing, ' 43 and producing a negative impact
on the author's high reputation.
Prouty asserted a right to prevent alteration of her literary
characters for use in another medium." Through an equitable
unfair competition approach, the district court established a
foundation for protecting an artist's moral rights:
If it should appear that in these broadcasts the defendant
had appropriated, without plaintiff's consent, the plot and
principal characters of the novel, and that the use being made
of her literary production was such as to injure the reputation
of the work and of the author, and to amount to a deception
39. See infra notes 103-19 and 135-39 and accompanying text.
40. See irfma notes 147-71 and accompanying text.
41. 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1939).
42. Id. at 265.
43. Id. at 266.
44. Id. at 265.
[Vol. 9:383
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upon the public, it may well be that relief would be afforded by
applying well-recognized principles of equity which have been
developed in the field known as "unfair competition .... " It is
the injury to the author and a fraud upon the reading public
that constitute the real offense alleged.'
These strong statements by the district court in this pre-Lan-
ham Act case established unfair competition as a remedy for
invasion of an artist's moral rights. Today such a claim would
be pled under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
The Prouty court also addressed the defendant's contention
that no actual competition existed between the printed literary
form and radio broadcasts. However, the court held that "ab-
sence of the element of competition.., is not necessarily fatal
to the plaintiff's claim."4 Relying on the equities involved and
citing Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co.,47 the court noted
that the term "unfair competition" is only a "convenient name
for the doctrine... [and that] [t]here is no fetish in the word
'competition.' ,4 Thus, the court de-emphasized the need for
actual competition where the unfairness of the wrong offended
principles of equity. In so holding, the court clearly estab-
lished unfair competition guidelines under which redress could
be sought for intrusion upon an artist's rights of moral pater-
nity and integrity. The Prouty court recognized a concept
which is today incorporated into the Lanham Act: mere likeli-
hood of confusion is sufficient to state a cause of action for un-
fair competition.49
B. Post-Section 43(a) Case Law
Building on the groundwork established in Prouty for pro-
tecting an artist's moral rights, section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, promulgated in 1946, established the federal law of unfair
competition.'o Under section 43(a), unfair competition claims
may be invoked to protect the creator of a work against false
attribution, misappropriation and mutilation of his or her work.
However, even though Prouty appeared to endorse the validity
of non-statutory unfair competition claims of this nature, little
evidence exists that Congress intended section 43(a) to encom-
45. Id. at 266.
46. Id.
47. 300 F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924).
48. 26 F. Supp. at 266 (citing Vogue v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 F. at 512).
49. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 261, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
50. See supra note 19.
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pass moral rights.51 In fact, it was almost six years after the
passage of the Lanham Act before an opinion discussed moral
rights at any length.52 Another two years passed before a sec-
tion 43(a) unfair competition cause of action was filed to pro-
tect an artistic work from being presented in a manner
potentially misleading and different from that for which it was
created."
1. Early Section 43(a) Cases
The first post-Lanham Act case to explicitly discuss moral
rights in an American context was Granz v. Harris." In Granz,
the plaintiff, a well known record producer, contracted to sell
to the defendant master recordings for a set of jazz concerts.
The contract provided that the plaintiff be given the credit line
"Presented by Norman Granz," and that liner notes prepared
by Granz be included on the record jackets.5 The defendant
eventually pressed a record at a different speed and on smaller
size discs than those for which the master recordings were cre-
ated,5e deleting approximately eight minutes of music.57
The majority found that the defendant could, consistent
with the contract's express terms, use the master discs to pro-
duce an abbreviated record.58 However, the court looked be-
yond the express provisions of the contract and found an
implied contractual limitation on the defendant's ability to do
so because of the plaintiff's required credit line. 9 In effect, by
marketing the truncated version of the Granz concerts and in-
dicating, as contractually required, that Norman Granz was the
source of the abbreviated concerts, the defendant committed
the tort of unfair competition.6° The shortened versions
presented to the public a garbled, abbreviated and clearly dif-
51. See Maslow, supra note 10, at 384-86. See also Bauer, supra note 10, at 680-82.
52. See Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 589-91 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J., concurring)
upheld on other grounds, discussed infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
53. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed infra
notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
54. 198 F.2d at 589-91.
55. Id. at 586. 'Liner notes' are often included on album covers, describing the
performer, composer, and history of the musical composition.
56. Id. at 587.
57. Id. at 587-88.
58. Id. at 588.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 589.
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ferent record than that produced by Mr. Granz on his original
masters.
By finding unfair competition factors implied in a contrac-
tual relationship, the court protected the creator's interest in
having his work be free from alteration. Thus, Granz used
breach of contract as a basis for protecting an artist's work.
The strength of the holding, however, stems from the implied
tort of unfair competition, which resulted when the defendant
retained the required credit line while issuing a substantially
altered version.
After Granz, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reviewed a case in which section 43(a) was pled as
a cause of action to prevent mutilation of an artist's work. In
Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc.,81 noted cowboy star and
singer Gene Autry attempted to prevent movies in which he
acted from being shown on television in edited form. Because
the court found that the plaintiff clearly contracted away the
rights to exploit his performance, it never reached the section
43(a) issue. However, the court recognized that cutting and ed-
iting of films could reach a point of "emasculating the motion
pictures so that they would no longer contain substantially the
same motion and dynamic and dramatic qualities which it was
the purpose of the artist's employment to produce."62 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that with the advent of commercial
television, a theatrical film could be so altered for presentation
on television "as to make it appear that the artist actually en-
dorses the products of the programs' sponsors."' The implica-
tion of Autry was that a line might eventually have to be
drawn on permissible editing;, until the result was so foreign as
to blatantly represent something that did not exist originally,
the courts would refrain from assuming the role of artistic
reviewer.
2. Preminger And Stevens Strengthen The Concept Of
Protecting An Artist's Rights
The majority holdings in Granz and Autry were founded on
contract law and avoided the moral rights issues. This appears
to indicate a judicial reluctance to reach moral rights questions
where the case can be disposed of on other grounds. Two sub-
61. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).




sequent cases showed less judicial reluctance to intervene in
artistic determinations."
In Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp.," the plaintiff, film
producer and director Otto Preminger, sought to prevent tele-
vision distribution of his film Anatomy Of A Murder under the
defendant's licensing agreements with over one hundred televi-
sion stations. Those agreements permitted each individual
television station to edit and cut the film for commercial inter-
ruption and time segment requirements, with no limit as to the
amount of cutting that could be done." Although in his con-
tract Preminger reserved a final cut right in the film, the court
determined that he had granted television distribution rights
to Columbia Pictures with no limitations on editing or inter-
ruptions. Looking to industry custom, the court concluded that
Preminger's final cut rights applied only to theatrical release
of the film. The court also found that Preminger was aware of
the standard industry practice in licensing films to television,
in which the right to interrupt for commercials and to edit for
necessary time segments was included. 7
The court noted, however, that the plaintiff would be enti-
tled to injunctive relief if the cutting amounted to mutilation.
The court implied that it would make an artistic determination
that the film had been "mutilated" if the 161 minute film was
cut to 53 minutes or even 100 minutes.6" Although the court
did not set specific guidelines for finding mutilation, its sugges-
tion that mutilation would result where a film was cut by one-
third dashed many filmmakers' hopes for relief where cuts
were less substantial.69 Judge Rabin dissented on appeal, 0
and underscored the producer's common law right, identified
earlier in Granz v. Harris,71 to have his work shown in an un-
mutilated version, particularly where the contract calls for giv-
64. See infra notes 65-83 and accompanying text.
65. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966).
66. Id. at 399.
67. Id. at 401-02.
68. Id. at 402.
69. The only case holding that mutilation resulted from unauthorized cutting is
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In Gilliam, the
court found that a twenty-seven percent cut of the television program mutilated the
creator's work. See infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
70. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 872 (N.Y. App. Div.
1966) (Rabin, J., dissenting).
71. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
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ing credit to the producer when the film is shown.7'
Three weeks after Preminger was decided, a California supe-
rior court considered Stevens v. National Broadcasting Com-
pany." In Stevens, producer and director George Stevens
sought to enjoin the National Broadcasting Company (NBC)
from cutting or interrupting his film A Place In The Sun for
presentation on television. To a limited extent, Stevens was
successful. The court enjoined NBC from distorting the effect,
mood, and continuity of the picture through the manner in
which commercials were inserted.74 Although the order al-
lowed insertion of commercials, it prohibited their use in such
a way as to "adversely affect or emasculate the artistic or picto-
rial quality of the film, or destroy or distort materially or sub-
stantially the mood, the effect or the continuity of the film. 75
Preminger was based on a contract analysis, whereas Judge
Nutter based his holding in Stevens on the tort of false light.76
Judge Nutter found support in Preminger's dicta for the under-
lying concept of protecting a work from substantial mutilation.
He also relied on the finding in Autry77 and the concurrence in
Granz,78 both of which accepted the premise that one should be
protected from substantial mutilation of one's creation.
Although Judge Nutter expressly stated that he was not basing
his order on the concept of moral rights,79 he held that through
injunctive relief "the court has the right to protect the artistic
integrity of a product. ''ac Thus, the judge emphasized the
72. Preminger v. Columbia Pictures, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 875.
73. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Co. 1966).
74. Id. at 758.
75. Id. See also Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right,"
16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 497 (1968).
76. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 756. The tort of false light was applied by Judge Nut-
ter "to protect the work of an artist, or an author, or a director or a producer where
the commercial interruptions would tend to mislead the public, or would tend to ac-
tually emasculate or destroy the mood and effect of the creative work." Id. at 755.
The tort of false light occurs where a plaintiff is presented to the public in a mislead-
ing manner although the underlying facts might be accurate. See Prosser, Privaciy,
48 CALIF. L, REV. 383, 398-400 (1960). In a moral rights context, this occurs where an
artistic creation is attributed to plaintiff when it has been changed from its original
form.
77. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed supra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text.
78. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952), discussed supra notes 54-58 and accompanying
text.
79. 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 756.
80. Id. at 757.
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court's power to protect the moral integrity of an artist's
creation.
Subsequent to the order for injunctive relief, NBC presented
A Place In The Sun with nine commercial interruptions, and
Stevens initiated contempt proceedings."' The court found
that the prior order was sufficiently broad to permit nine inter-
ruptions at scene and mood changes.8 2 However, one commen-
tator has interpreted the court's holding as suggesting that
"nine interruptions approached, perhaps even reached, the
limits of permissibility, but did not constitute contempt because
of the strength of the film.""
Although both Preminger and Stevens sought to protect
their works from alteration, neither advanced their claim
under section 43(a). The limited history of section 43(a) as a
cause of action in mutilation and alteration cases at that time,8"
and the apparent reluctance of courts to make artistic determi-
nations, may have deterred the plaintiffs' counsel in these cases
from seeking redress under the Lanham Act.
3. Section 43(a) Found To Serve As A Creator's Remedy
The preceding cases indicate a reluctance on the part of
courts to address moral rights directly. However, there appears
to be a corresponding desire to protect artistic creations from
both false attribution and alteration. With the promulgation of
section 43(a), a potential statutory remedy was available to
protect an artist's moral rights through unfair competition.
With the exception of Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc.,8 it
took approximately twenty-two years for a court to consider
section 43(a) in relation to protecting the work of an artist. Fi-
nally, in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.,w the court held that
section 43(a) serves as a creator's remedy for unfair competi-
tion arising from use of a false designation of origin or any
false description or representation. 7 The court emphasized
81. Stevens v. National Broadcasting Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 572 (Cal. Super.
Ct., L.A. Co. 1966).
82. Id. at 572-73.
83. Treece, 8supra note 75, at 497 n.36.
84. Prior to 1966, only Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954),
addressed a section 43(a) mutilation or alteration cause of action. See supra notes 61-
63 and accompanying text.
85. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954). See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
86. 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
87. Id. at 267. See 8upra note 19 for the text of section 43(a).
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that section 43(a) is a remedial provision and should be read
broadly."
In Geisel, the defendants marketed dolls displaying the
plaintiff's well known commercial name, Dr. Seuss, on the
product. Defendants claimed an actual right to market such
items under contracts to create illustrations and essays entered
into by Geisel and the defendant's predecessors more than
thirty years earlier." The court found the evidence asserting
such contractual rights insubstantial and proceeded to analyze
the defendant's actions under section 43(a). This unfair com-
petition theory was based on the defendants' intentional mis-
representation to the public that the "plaintiff created, de-
signed, manufactured, produced, authorized or approved the
design of the dolls and the dolls themselves."9° The court
found that the intent and probable effect of such misrepresen-
tation was customer confusion and passing off of the products
as those of the plaintiff.9' The court held that protection
against such unfair competition was necessary to secure an art-
ist's paternity and maintain his reputation.'
The Geisel court clarified many longstanding questions con-
cerning section 43(a). The case established that "origin" in
"false designation of origin" was not intended to be a mere geo-
graphical reference, but that it applied to "any representation
with respect to the originator of a product i.e. a particular
source of manufacture by a certain business. 9 3 Moreover, the
court determined that a section 43(a) cause of action would ex-
ist under either an express or an implied representation that a
product was authorized or approved by a particular person. 4
Extending this concept, the court held that liability should not
be limited to descriptions and representations that are literally
false, but should include actions that create a false impres-
sion.9 The court also stated that actual palming off was not
necessary, but that a showing of a likelihood of customer con-
88. Id. (referring to Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d
538, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (Clark, CJ., concurring)).
89. 283 F. Supp. 261, 264 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
90. Id. at 266.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 267.






fusion as to the source of the goods is sufficient.96 Accordingly,
the court determined that to obtain injunctive relief plaintiff
was not required to show that the alleged misrepresentation
resulted in the actual diversion of business or that customers
were actually deceived. Rather, the "[pjlaintiff need only
demonstrate that the false representations 'have a tendency to
deceive.' "
The analysis in Geisel was extensive and has served as the
reference point for subsequent cases which have attempted to
find moral rights protection under the guise of section 43(a).
As will be examined, such attempts by authors, performers,
television and film producers and directors, and other artists
have rarely been successful. Though some courts have ap-
peared receptive to moral rights protection under section 43(a),
the majority has narrowly limited its use as a remedy to false
designation of origin and false attribution.9 Failure to give
moral rights broader protection may be based on an overriding
concern with economic interests. °° Thus, to provide even lim-
ited protection, courts have focused on the artist's contractual
rights, if any, in the work he created, or, in the alternative,
they have relied on the tort theories of misrepresentation or
false light.'0 ' However, a few cases have considered section
43(a) as a remedy where an artist's work has allegedly been
mutilated.
0 2
4. Current Section 43(a) Theories
Geisel and Yameta Co., Ltd. v. Capitol Records, Inc.,l°3 intro-
duced an era in which section 43(a) was applied more fre-
quently to protect artists. These post-1967 cases have
broadened significantly the application of section 43(a) as an
artist's remedy. An examination of the several cases which
have contributed to the expanding reach of section 43(a) identi-
96. Id.
97. Id. at 268 (citing Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641,
649 (3d Cir. 1958)).
98. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976), is consid-
ered the only true mutilation case to have held favorably for a plaintiff. See infra
notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
99. These interests may be considered analogous to the moral right of paternity.
100. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
101. See supra notes 54-84 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 145-81.
103. 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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fies three primary theories of relief: false designation of ori-
gin, literary false attribution, and alteration or mutilation.
a. False Designation of Origin
In several cases involving the music industry, false designa-
tion of origin and false description have been equated to the
paternity right of false attribution. Although the moral rights
holdings of these cases are limited to protection against false
attribution, they are often cited for protection from uncon-
sented alteration. As considered below, a finding of false attri-
bution is often the result of mutilation.1° Thus, such a domino
effect gives rise to a more successful moral paternity/false at-
tribution claim under section 43(a) than under a mutilation/in-
tegrity right claim.
In Yameta, based on a section 43(a) claim, the court issued a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Capitol Records from ad-
vertising and utilizing jacket art promoting Jimi Hendrix as a
featured player on a particular album. In reality, Hendrix was
a mere back-up musician on the album. The court found that
the international acclaim achieved by Hendrix and the implica-
tion that he was a featured player on the album created a false
impression of the artist's contribution to the work and was
likely to deceive consumers. 0 5
In Rich v. RCA Corp.,10e singer Charlie Rich and CBS
Records obtained an injunction under section 43(a) prohibiting
RCA from distributing an album of songs recorded by Rich ten
to fourteen years earlier.1°7 The gravamen of the complaint
was likelihood of confusion; RCA had packaged the album
with a contemporary picture of Rich and insufficient notice to
the consuming public of the time period during which the
songs were recorded.108 The court found likely deception of,
and resultant confusion to, consumers as to the true contents
of the package and the work itself.1 09 Furthermore, the court
found that harm to Rich's reputation and irreparable injury
would likely result."0 This outcome differed somewhat from
104. See infm notes 180-81, 190-91 and accompanying text.
105. Yameta, 279 F. Supp. 586-87.
106. 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
107. Id.





an earlier case with similar facts involving the same plaintiffs,
CBS v. Gusto Records, Inc."' In that case, the court did not
enjoin distribution of the album, finding that an injunction
might have caused considerable financial harm to the defend-
ant."1 However, the court did require decals to be affixed on
the albums to correctly identify their contents.
11 3
In Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp.,"' noted jazz
guitarist and singer George Benson brought an action under
section 43(a) to enjoin distribution and sale of an album adver-
tised as "George Benson, Erotic Moods" and captioned "X
Rated LP."' 1 5 The album contained tracks from recording ses-
sions held five to twelve years earlier while Benson was un-
known to the general public, serving merely as a back-up studio
musician. After Benson gained international popularity, the
defendant altered the recordings to highlight Benson's guitar
tracks and overdubbed one of the selections with the sexually
suggestive moaning of a woman.1 " The record was then pack-
aged in an album jacket featuring a current picture of Benson
and appeared to attribute the artistic content to him."7 The
court found the defendant's attribution false and misleading in
violation of section 43(a) because it was likely to harm Ben-
son's reputation, mislead the public, and hurt the sale of future
Benson albums."'
If the integrity of the Benson and Hendrix contributions to
the released albums had been enforceable through the concept
of moral rights as followed in European countries,"19 the
defendants would have been prohibited from altering the per-
formers' guitar tracks and falsely describing Benson and Hen-
drix's contributions to those albums as substantial. However,
111. 403 F.Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974).
112. Id. at 449.
113. I& Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (cited frequently in
support of section 43(a) false attribution and mutilation claims) was appealed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Prior to a decision by the
appellate court, the parties settled on terms similar to those ordered in CBS v. Gusto
Records, Inc., i.e., affixing decals to the albums. Thus, both Rich and CBS had similar
resolutions. Conversation with Donald E. Biederman, former counsel for CBS
Records (Apr. 7, 1986).
114. 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
115. Id. at 517.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 518.
119. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
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while integrity rights alone do not give rise to a section 43(a)
remedy, the Yameta and Benson plaintiffs were able to protect
those same integrity interests by basing their claims in false
attribution. Thus, as applied in Rich and CBS, section 43(a) has
become an effective remedy in the music industry to protect
against misrepresentation and to protect the moral right to be
free from false attribution. As applied in Yameta and Benson,
section 43(a) has also effectively prohibited alteration or muti-
lation of an artist's work which results in false attribution.
b. Literary False Attribution
The evolving interpretation by courts of section 43(a) as a
broad remedial statute120 has given strength to authors' claims
for proper attribution of their work and freedom from material
alterations of their creative product.' 21 This broad approach to
section 43(a), which leads to support for protecting an author's
paternity and integrity rights, is demonstrated in Follett v. The
New American Library, Inc .m2
Follett involved the publication and authorship attribution
of an American edition of a book originally published in
French, later translated to German and English, and thereafter
re-edited and re-worked by Ken Follett for publication in Brit-
ain under the title The Heist of the Century. Follett was hired
by a British publishing house to refashion the work by "re-
structuring the story, bringing style to the writing..., develop-
120. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
121. See also Chesler v. Avon Book Division, 76 Misc.2d 1048, 352 N.Y.S.2d 552
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1973), a state case which found that "[a]n author or artist is enti-
tled to judicial protection where there is sufficient demonstration of mutilation or
other serious alteration of the creator's work." Id. at 1051, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 556. The
Czesler court found that even where the author contracted away the right for varia-
tions in the work, including condensed or abridged versions, the author should not be
"powerless to prevent slipshod or truncated use of her work." Id. at 1051, 352
N.Y.S.2d at 555. The court held that defendant must tell the truth about the work it
was selling to the public, i.e., that it was not a book with the same content for which
plaintiff had originally received critical acclaim. Id. at 1052, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 557.
Although not brought as an unfair competition action, plaintiff's claim for "tortious
conduct, including the unfaithful and negligent reproduction of her work, libel and a
violation of her civil rights," rested under historical causes of action used to seek
redress for acts which are accepted today as unfair competition. Id. at 1050, 352
N.Y.S.2d at 554. Here defendant's sale of an abridged and condensed paperback ver-
sion of plaintiff's original book, after materially altering the work, misrepresented
and falsely attributed its content to the original author. An acceptable resolution in
this court's view appeared to be placement of stickers on the product indicating that
it was an abridged or condensed version of the original.
122. 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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ing the characters and filling in gaps."' 3
During preparation of the re-worked manuscript, Follett
sought to obtain both a by-line credit and an interest in the
copyright.124 The proprietor of the literary rights, Star Agency
Establishment, readily agreed to the credit request but not to
the copyright request, which was later dropped.M The by-line
consisted of a title page credit, of "Rene Louis Maurice with
Ken Follett."''  The Heist of the Century was thereafter pub-
lished in Britain with the Follett credit.
Subsequently, Follett authored two best sellers published by
Arbor House and achieved international fame.'2 After Follett
ceased his association with Arbor House and joined the New
American Library Company, Arbor House acquired the Ameri-
can rights to The Heist of the Century. Arbor House changed
the title to The Gentlemen of 16 July, and prepared to release
it at the same time New American scheduled the release of
Follett's new novel, Key to Rebecca."s Arbor House intended to
promote The Gentlemen of 16 July, by exploiting Follett's edi-
torial participation as that of an author. This was to be accom-
plished by creating authorship on the book's cover as "by the
author of TRIPLE and EYE OF THE NEEDLE, KEN FOI-
LETT with Rene Louis Maurice."'' Only Follett's name was
to appear on the spine portion of the book jacket.13 Follett
filed suit to enjoin Arbor House from publishing the book and
using the authorship attribution in a false and misleading
manner.1
3 1
In its analysis, the court reviewed customs and practices in
the publishing trade. While Follett may have done more than
just edit the work, the parties did not agree on industry prac-
tices regarding authorship attribution for an editor. 32 The
123. Id. at 306. The original French publication was attributed to "Rene Louis
Maurice," a pseudonym for three French journalists who collaborated on the work.
Id.
124. Id. at 307.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. Eye of the Needle and Triple by Ken Follett achieved both critical and
financial success sufficient to induce New American Library to advance $3,000,000 to
Follett for his next three books. Id.
128. I& at 308.
129. Id. (emphasis in original).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 305.
132. Id. at 311.
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plaintiff claimed that it was rare in the industry for a freelance
editor to receive authorship credit," whereas the defendant
argued that a publisher has discretion to attribute authorship
to an editor where the editor's work was "not trivial."'
4
In addressing the "key issue" of whether Arbor House's
planned designation of authorship violated section 43(a), the
court found it necessary to consider the concept of "author-
ship."135 It found that the book evidenced Follett's style and
craftsmanship and that his contributions were indeed substan-
tial.13 However, it determined that those factors were insuffi-
cient to raise Follett to the level of "author" because he
received a fixed plot, cast of characters and set of themes.137
Accordingly, the court found that Follett's greater-than-ordi-
nary editorial "contributions display[ed] none of the special
creative attributes which are associated with authorship,"'-"
and that holding him out as principal author of the work was
literally false. Analogizing to Benson, the court found that the
intended attribution on the cover, spine and title page falsely
made it appear that Follett was the major author of the book:
The Lanham Act, as construed in Benson ... , is designed
not only to vindicate "the author's personal right to prevent
the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form"
... but also to protect the public and the artist from misrepre-
sentations of the artist's contribution to a finished work.13e
In its final order, the court permitted Arbor House to display
the credit "Rene Louis Maurice and Ken Follett."
The Follett case is important in many respects. It clearly es-
tablishes that one should not receive false and misleading
credit for one's contribution to creative work, and protects the
artist's personal rights and the public's right to be free from
133. 1d This industry practice claim should be distinguished from the specific case
where Follett negotiated the "with Ken Follett" authorship credit on the British edi-
tion of The Heist of the Century. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
134. 497 F. Supp. at 311. Arbor House's president gave support to Follett's claim
when he testified that "authors do not permit editors to obtain authorship credit,....
even if the revisions are substantial." Id. at 309. Though the issue of industry prac-
tices was not identified by the court as the key issue in the case, it is related and
important to this author's overall analysis of the case.








commercial misrepresentation. The court held both of these
interests protectable under section 43(a).
Of particular note are the Follett court's comments regard-
ing industry practices. After reviewing asserted industry prac-
tices with respect to attribution of authorship, including the
claim that substantial contributions may be attributed to indi-
viduals at the publisher's discretion,140 the court emphatically
stated that industry practices were of no resort against a mis-
representation that violates the Lanham Act.'41 Because of this,
where courts previously looked to standard trade practices to
interpret contracts when authorship attribution was not ex-
pressly provided for contractually,' 42 they may now disregard
trade practices and rely on their own experience, aesthetics,
and intellectual capacity to determine whether an artist's con-
tribution to a work has been materially altered to the com-
bined detriment of the creator and the public.
Findings of section 43(a) violations may be based on subjec-
tive assessments of artistic expression, leading to uneven de-
terminations by judges whose exposure to the art form at issue
may vary. However, despite this possible unevenness, artists
may favor such an approach as it impliedly validates, recog-
nizes, and gives priority to moral rights over industry trade
practices. This approach to finding section 43(a) relief would be
available ofter a court considered the contractual obligations of
the parties. Thus, a court finding no contractual covenant cov-
ering the challenged false attribution or alteration might then
proceed directly to section 43(a) considerations, disregarding
any custom or industry standard.
Follett has expanded section 43(a) as an artist's remedy and
has strengthened the earlier holding in Gilliam v. Amercan
Broadcasting Companies,143 where mutilation resulted in false
attribution. By extending Follett to mutilation cases, courts
may disregard industry practices in determining whether muti-
lation has occurred. While mutilation, by itself, does not have
a section 43(a) remedy, relief from mutilation may otherwise
be based on a section 43(a) theory of false attribution where
plaintiff has no recourse by contract.
140. 497 F. Supp. at 311. See also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
141. Id at 311.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
143. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
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c. Alteration Or Mutilation Of An Artist's Work
An artist's work, whether it be literary, fine art, perform-
ance, or film, is the result of his or her skill, talent, aesthetics,
and humanity. The artist's relationship to the work extends be-
yond its creation and includes an ongoing interest in retaining
the work's integrity"--that is, that it retain the shape, form,
and content in which it was intended to exist. The statutory
cause of action provided by section 43(a) gives artists a new
means of protecting their works from mutilation. Until 1976,145
courts refrained from making artistic determinations as to the
effects of mutilation or alteration on creative works. Courts
primarily recognized section 43(a) as a remedy for such acts
only in dicta, and based their holdings on other grounds.
46
The two cases considered below indicate a departure from that
position and show the evolving protective use of section 43(a) in
the area of mutilation and alteration of artists' works.
In Jaeger v. American International Pictures, Inc.,147 the
plaintiff claimed that the English version of his film, "Kamasu-
tra- Perfection of Love," was garbled, mutilated, and changed
without his consent. He asserted three causes of action: (1)
false attribution of his rights in literary property; (2) violation
of section 51 of the New York civil rights law,14 by use of his
name in connection with the promotion of the garbled and mu-
tilated version; and (3) violation of section 43(a), which resulted
from defendant's representation of the plaintiff as director and
co-author of the allegedly distorted work.'49 The court refused
to grant the preliminary injunction on the ground that any
present injury suffered by the plaintiff was "far outweighed by
144. See supra notes 1, 3-4 and accompanying text.
145. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
infra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
146. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667, 669-70 (9th Cir. 1954), dis-
cussed supra text accompanying notes 61-63 (relief denied on contract grounds,
though the court noted that cutting and editing of a film for television could violate
unfair competition laws); Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1952) (Frank, J.,
concurring), discussed supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (supporting relief
against publication of a truncated version of an artist's work, though so held on con-
tract grounds); Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274, 278 (S.D.N.Y.
1971), discussed infra notes 147-53 and accompanying text (in rejecting defendant's
motion to dismiss, the court noted that unfair competition may be proven where a
film, severely garbled, distorted, or mutilated, is presented to the public bearing the
creator's name).
147. 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
148. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKlnney 1987).
149. Jaeger, 330 F. Supp. at 275-76.
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the clear and substantial hurt defendant would suffer."'1'x
The court also denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. It is
this holding and the court's analysis of the issues underlying
its refusal to dismiss which support section 43(a) as a remedy
for mutilation claims. The court stated that regardless of
America's failure to provide a direct counterpart to the Euro-
pean doctrine of artists' moral rights, there was "enough in
plaintiff's allegations to suggest that he may yet be able to
prove a charge of unfair competition or otherwise tortious mis-
behavior in the distribution to the public of a film that bears
his name but at the same time severely garbles, distorts or mu-
tilates his work."''1 Thus, the court found that the facts as
stated in Jaeger's claim raised sufficient legal issues to support
a finding of unfair competition. The court also stated that sec-
tion 43(a) was an appropriate remedy for the false attribution
claim, finding it at least arguable that the defendant falsely at-
tributed to the plaintiff a film which no longer represented the
plaintiff's artistic creation.152
The Jaeger court implicitly recognized moral rights protec-
tion against mutilation and false attribution. While the court
found support in Yameta and Granz for its position on false
attribution, it failed to cite authority for protection against mu-
tilation.'5 By alternatively relying on the false attribution
claim, the court obviously recognized the weakness of its posi-
tion on mutilation. Thus, protection from mutilation once
again found itself supported in dictum with no legal or case
support.
The issue of moral rights protection was finally confronted
in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies.'m Gilliam
has been embraced as the seminal case supporting a creator's
moral right of integrity in his work through judicial use of the
section 43(a) remedy.5 The case involved Terry Gilliam and
150. Id. at 281. Defendant had spent more than $245,000 in promotion and distri-
bution activities up to the time of the hearing. Id
151. Id. at 278.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
155. See generally Comment, Protections of Artistic Integrity: Gilliam v. Ameri-
can Broadcasting Companies, 90 HARV. L. REV. 472 (1976); Comment, Moral Rights
for Artists Under the Lanham Act Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 18 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 595 (1977); Comment, The Monty Python Litigation-Of Moral Right
and The Lanham Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 611 (1977) [hereinafter The Monty Python
Litigation]; Comment Monty Python and The Lanham Act In Search of the Moral
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the other members of Monty Python, a popular British comedy
group. Monty Python, by agreement with the British Broad-
casting Company (BBC), authored and performed a television
comedy series. The Monty Python/BBC agreement contained
detailed procedures and guidelines for editing, changing, and
altering the group's work.lss The court stated that the essence
of the agreement was that, "while BBC retains final authority
to make changes, appellants (Monty Python) or their repre-
sentatives exercise optimum control over the scripts consistent
with BBC's authority and only minor changes may be made
without prior consultation with the writers. ' 157 The agree-
ment allowed Monty Python to retain all rights in the script
not expressly granted, and gave to the BBC the right to license
transmission of the shows in any overseas territory.'1T The
court noted that under the agreement the BBC was not specifi-
Right, 30 RUTGERS L REV. 452 (1977) [hereinafter Monty Python and The Lanham
Act]. See also Sokolow, A New Weapon For Artists'Righft" Section 439(a) [sic] of The
Lanham Trademark Act, 5 ART & THE LAW 32 (1980); and Maslow, supra note 10, at
386-87.
156. 538 F.2d at 17, n.2. The Agreement provided:
When script alterations are necessary it is the intention of the BBC to
make every effort to inform and to reach agreement with the Writer. When-
ever practicable any necessary alterations (other than minor alterations)
shall be made by the Writer. Nevertheless the BBC shall at all times have
the right to make (a) minor alterations and (b) such other alterations as in
its opinion are necessary in order to avoid involving the BBC in legal action
or bringing the BBC into disrepute. Any decision under (b) shall be made at
a level not below that of Head of Department. It is however agreed that
after a script has been accepted by the BBC alterations will not be made by
BBC under (b) above unless (i) the Writer, if available when the BBC re-
quires the alterations to be made, has been asked to agree to them but is not
willing to do so and (HI) the Writer has had, if he so requests and if the BBC
agrees that time permits if rehearsals and recording are to proceed as
planned, an opportunity to be represented by the Writers' Guild of Great
Britain (or if he is not a member of the Guild by his agent) at a meeting with
the BBC to be held within at most 48 hours of the request (excluding week-
ends). If in such circumstances there is no agreement about the alterations
then the final decision shall rest with the BBC. Apart from the right to make
alterations under (a) and (b) above the BBC shall not without the consent of
the Writer or his agent (which consent shall not be unreasonably withheld)
make any structural alterations as opposed to minor alterations to the
script, provided that such consent shall not be necessary in any case where
the Writer is for any reason not immediately available for consultation at the
time which in the BBC's opinion is the deadline from the production point of
view for such alterations to be made if rehearsals and recording are to pro-
ceed as planned.
IC




cally empowered to make unilateral changes in the work or al-
ter the work once it had been recorded.159
Under its licensing authority, the BBC licensed Time-Life
Films to distribute the Monty Python series in the United
States within a package of British television programs. This
agreement, to which Monty Python was not a party, allowed
editing of programs "for insertion of commercials, applicable
censorship or governmental ... rules and regulations, and
National Association of Broadcasters and time segment
requirements. '' 60e
In July 1975, Time-Life licensed the rights to six thirty-
minute Monty Python shows to the American Broadcasting
Company for presentation in two ninety-minute television spe-
cials.' 6l The ABC/Time-Life agreement incorporated commer-
cials, censorship, and time segment requirements similar to
those encompassed in the BBC/Time-Life agreement. On Oc-
tober 3, 1975, ABC broadcast the first special after cutting ap-
proximately twenty-four minutes from the original ninety
minutes of Monty Python material. 6 2 After viewing a tape of
the edited version, Monty Python initiated legal action to pro-
hibit broadcast of the second special scheduled for broadcast on
December 26, 19 75 .1e
Monty Python's attempt to enjoin the broadcast was based
on claims that the work had been mutilated in violation of sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act and that the editing infringed
common law copyright. Judge Lasker, in an unpublished opin-
ion, cited extensively at the appellate level, did not grant the
injunction but did require ABC to broadcast a disclaimer dur-
ing the upcoming broadcast indicating that the group had "dis-
associated itself from the program because of editing."' 4
Judge Lasker decided not to grant the preliminary injunction
after considering the equities involved and the unanswered is-
sues surrounding the litigation. The district court noted that
[1] it was unclear who owned the copyright in the programs
produced by the BBC from scripts written by Monty Python;
159. I. at 21.
160. Id. at 18 (quoting BBC/Time-Life Agreement of October, 1973).
161. Id. Monty Python had previously refused to license the programs to ABC
because the broadcast would be presented in a disjoined format. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The court of appeals granted a stay of that order and required only lir.
Ited notice indicating that the program was edited by ABC. Id.
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[2] that there was a question of whether Time-Lfe and BBC
were indispensable parties to the litigation; [3] that ABC
would suffer significant financial loss if it were enjoined a
week before the scheduled broadcast; and [4] that Monty Py-
thon had displayed a "somewhat disturbing casualness" in
their pursuance of the matter.'
The appellate court found that the district court's primary con-
cern was the potential economic hardship to ABC if forced to
cancel a program scheduled for broacast within seven days of
the hearing. However, Judge Lasker did find that mutilation
of the shows occurred and was likely to cause irreparable in-
jury to the plaintiffs.' It was ABC's cutting of the shows
which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit relied on six months later when it granted the preliminary
injunction.
The appellate court found that "the cuts made constituted an
actionable mutilation" of Monty Python's work' 7 and that
plaintiffs would likely succeed on the merits of a mutilation
theory. The court cited the European doctrine of droit moral
for the "right of the artist to have his work attributed to him
in the form in which he created it."'" The court held that
copyright law provided no basis to support Monty Python's
mutilation claim, since copyright interests are economic and
"cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to obtain re-
lief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the
public on which the artists are financially dependent."'1 9 Lim-
ited by the economically based strictures on copyright law re-
lief, the court sought refuge and support in the reasonings of
Prouty, Granz, Autry, Geisel, Rich, and Jaeger.170 The court
concluded that the truncated version of the programs materi-
ally "impaired the integrity of appellants' work" and that the
version broadcast "represented to the public as the product of
appellants what was actually a mere caricature of their
talents."'' n
In Gilliam, the court found a way to protect artists' moral
rights. Referring to Granz and Prouty, the court noted that
165. Id.
166. Id. at 19.
167. Id. at 23-24.
168. Id. at 24.
169. Id.
170. I& at 24-25.
171. Id at 25.
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relief from misrepresentation of an artist's work could be
based in either contract or tort law. 72 The court also cited
Rich and Geisel in support of the proposition that "a represen-
tation of a product, although technically true, creates a false
impression of the product's origin,"'17 and may be a violation of
section 43(a). The court analogized Gilliam to Prouty, Granz,
Rich, and Geisel, finding that ABC's editing of the works
reached the point where the programs no longer represented
the original creative endeavors. The result was false attribu-
tion of authorship, misrepresentation to the public, and injury
to the artists. Concluding that mutilation occurred, the court
suggested that section 43(a) would be a proper claim. "Thus,
an allegation that a defendant has presented to the public a
'garbled,' distorted version of plaintiff's work seeks to address
the very rights sought to be protected by the Lanham Act ... ,
and should be recognized as a cause of action under that
statute.'
17 4
Judge Gurfein concurred in the finding of infringement of
the common law copyright claim; however, he felt it unneces-
sary to consider the section 43(a) claim where the same relief
could be granted on plaintiff's traditional claims. He stated:
"[T]he Lanham Act is not a substitute for droit moral which
authors in Europe enjoy. '17' According to Judge Gurfein, the
application of section 43(a) to artistic integrity is outside the
scope of the Lanham Act which "only goes to misdescription of
origin and the like.'1 76 Despite Judge Gurfein's disagreement,
the majority's holding that mutilation of an artist's work may
support a section 43(a) unfair competition claim was a step for-
ward for the protection of moral rights and gave rise to greater
hope among the artistic community. 77
Gilliam has attracted significant interest in the legal and ar-
tistic communities for its apparent expansion of section 43(a)
as a claim for mutilation of an artist's work. However, close
reading indicates that the holding is limited to very specific
facts and that mutilation itself is not the sole basis for the
172. Id. at 24.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 24-25 (citing Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954);
Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)).
175. 538 F.2d at 27.
176. Id.
177. See Sokolow, supra note 155, at 34. See also Maslow, upra note 10, at 386-87.
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court's finding of unfair competition.1 78 The rights asserted by
Monty Python in the scripts may be viewed as moral rights,
but these rights were also grounded in the group's contractual
arrangement with the BBC. Since the group retained all rights
not expressly granted to the BBC, Monty Python had economic
and proprietary interests in those that remained. When ABC
infringed on those rights, the underlying basis on which Monty
Python asserted mutilation of the work was that the group re-
tained editorial rights. Therefore, although asserting the
group's interests as the artists who created the work, the group
concurrently held an ownership interest in the altered product
which could be protected by contract law. The opinion suggests
that the court gave much credence to the contractual limita-
tions by which Monty Python controlled the programs and
through which it retained economic and proprietary interests
in its creation. 9
When a product or work of art is altered without the crea-
tor's consent and is subsequently represented to the public as
unchanged, a false attribution occurs. Thus, in this context,
the moral right of integrity (the right not to have one's work
altered) is inexorably linked to the moral right of paternity
(the right to have one's work accurately attributed to him).
The Gilliam court recognized this link between the moral
rights of paternity and integrity when it stated that the right
not to have one's work mutilated "may generally be summa-
rized as including the right of the artist to have his work attrib-
uted to him in the form in which he created it."'80 Accordingly,
178. The argument that mutilation alone does not support the court's holding was
considered in The Monty Python Litigation, supra note 155, at 623-24.
179. The court referred to "the fact that the editing was substantial, i.e., approxi-
mately 27 per cent of the original program was omitted, and the editing contravened
contractual provisions that limited the right to edit the Monty Python material." 538
F.2d at 19 (emphasis added). Although this author does not find mutilation of an
artist's work an independent ground supporting a section 43(a) claim, the Gilliam
court's determination that ABC's cuts affected "essential elements in the schematic
development of a story line," id. at 25; see also id, at 25 n.12, combined with the omis-
sion of climactic scenes and resolutions, and the sheer enormity of the editing (more
than one-quarter of the original was eliminated) enabled the court to draw on the
earlier cases and the court's intellectual and aesthetic appreciation of art to conclude
that mutilation had occurred. Preminger also supports the theory that mutilation
occurs with the deletion of a certain amount of the work. See supra notes 65-72 and
accompanying text. In Preminger, the court implied that cutting one-third of the film
could equal mutilation, while in Gilliam twenty-seven percent of the film was cut.
180. 538 F.2d at 24. See also The Monty Python Litigation, aupra note 155, at 623
n.67 and accompanying text ("Gilliam held that the right to insist on the integrity of
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it appears that misdescription, misrepresentation, or false
designation of origin is the statutory basis for which section
43(a) can be invoked to protect an artist's rights.181 In finding
mutilation, the Gilliam court indirectly recognized the exist-
ence of a false attribution cause of action, strengthening the
basis for utilizing a section 43(a) remedy.
Both Gilliam and Jaeger have increased the remedial reach
of section 43(a) by adding the moral right of integrity as a con-
sideration in statutory unfair competition claims. The follow-
ing section considers how extensively section 43(a) has since
been used as a remedy against infringement of the moral rights
of paternity and integrity, and how section 43(a), as inter-
preted, might apply to selected recent events in the film indus-
try, possibly amounting to moral rights violations.
II
Analysis
A. Limitations On Section 43(a) As A Moral Rights Remedy
The moral rights of paternity and integrity are unofficially
recognized by the courts.8 2 This section considers whether and
to what extent these two moral rights have made a niche for
themselves in our legal system under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act.
Since its promulgation in 1946, section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act has served to redress the wrongs comprising unfair compe-
tition. These wrongs occur when there is "a false designation
of origin, or any false description or representation ... ,,3 The
moral right of paternity, which is the right to be free from false
attribution, has also found protection under this section 43(a)
language.'8 Courts have held that an artist's work is misrepre-
one's work may be enforced through the Section 43(a) paternity right-the right to
be free from false attribution of authorship" (emphasis in original)).
181. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). Sec-
tion 43(a) expressly prohibits "a false designation of origin, or any false description or
representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or repre-
sent the same .... "
182. These two moral rights are not recognized officially because they do not, per
se, exist in our laws. Instead, the rights sought to be protected under these concepts
are often preserved by application of other legal theories.
183. Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act) § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
184. See Follett v. The New American Library, Inc., 497 F. Supp. 304' (S.D.N.Y.
1980), discussed supra notes 122-42 and accompanying text; Benson v. Paul Winley
Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed supra notes 114-18 and
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sented if the work does not properly and accurately identify
contributions that the artist made to the work. This was the
conclusion in the music cases,lss where the performer's actual
contributions differed from that which was represented to the
public, causing injury to both consumers and the artist.
Crossing artistic mediums, the court in Follett v. The New
American Library used section 43(a) to enjoin a publishing
company from falsely attributing an editor's contributions to a
book as those of the primary author. Follett clearly supported
the concept, inherent in the moral right of paternity, that attri-
bution to a work should be limited to the extent of the actual
contribution. Follett also established that industry practices
had no import where false attribution violated section 43(a).186
The potential impact of such holdings regarding industry
custom is substantial and likely to continue as an issue in fu-
ture entertainment industry litigation."8 7 It appears that an in-
itial question a court must ask is whether there is a false
attribution. The answer to this question must be influenced by
considering industry practice. Even the Follett court consid-
ered evidence of industry customs in defining the terms au-
thor, editor, and contributor. Although questions remain over
the future effect of the court's statement regarding industry
customs and practice, there is no doubt that Follett strength-
ened section 43(a) as an effective remedy for infringement of
the moral right of paternity when a work is falsely attributed
to an artist or where a work is presented to the public in a
form no longer representative of the artist's creation.
Whereas the moral right of paternity has found direct sup-
port under section 43(a), the integrity interest-the right to be
accompanying text; Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed
supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text; Yameta v. Capitol Records, 279 F. Supp.
582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed supra note 105 and accompanying text.
185. Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
discussed supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text; Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp.
530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text; CBS v.
Gusto Records, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Tenn. 1974), discussed supra notes 111-13
and accompanying text; Yameta v. Capitol Records, 279 F. Supp. 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1968),
discussed supra note 105 and accompanying text.
186. 497 F. Supp. at 311. See supra text accompanying notes 140-41.
187. Although not decided under statutory unfair competition, in both Stevens v.
National Broadcasting Company, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755 (Cal. Sup. Ct., LA. Co.
1966) and Preminger v. Columbia Pictures, 148 U..P.Q. (BNA) 398 (N.Y. Super. Ct.,
N.Y. Co. 1966) the courts relied on film industry customs and practices. See supra
notes 65-82 and accompanying text.
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free from mutilation or alteration of the creator's work-has
found support in the holding of only one case, Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Companies,'"M though also discussed in
dicta of other cases.'8 9 Gilliam seemed to present a landmark
holding that unfair competition, as recognized by section 43(a),
protects an artist's work from mutilation.19° However, Gilliam
has found no express judicial support in the eleven years since
its decision. This may be because a finding of mutilation is
likely to create a concurrent claim for false attribution. When
a work is mutilated, it is no longer that of its creator, and thus
the creator's integrity interest is infringed. When the work is
then presented to the public as that of the original creator, it
simultaneously infringes on the creator's paternity interest.
Where mutilation is found, courts may provide relief under a
more traditional section 43(a) remedy, protecting an artist's
right to be free from false attribution, rather than basing their
holdings on the protection of an artist's integrity interest, a
right which has been held protectable only in Gilliam.9'
The cases considered above have shown the development of
section 43(a) as an artist's remedy. Currently, there is no doubt
that an artist can seek relief under section 43(a) where his
moral right of paternity is infringed and a false attribution is
found. However, protection of the moral right of integrity has
not been recognized in the United States and will require ex-
pansion beyond Gilliam to create reliable protection under
section 43(a).
B. Application To The Film Industry
The film industry utilizes the skills and talents of many art-
ists and thereby is made susceptible to paternity and integrity
infringement claims. One reason section 43(a) has had little
impact on enforcing the moral rights of artists in the film and
entertainment industries is that disputes are rarely litigated in
court. Unions representing artists from various fields use con-
tracts containing clauses which require members and employ-
188. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See supra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
189. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed upra
notes 61-63 and accompanying text; Jaeger v. American Int'l Pictures, Inc., 330 F.
Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), discussed upra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
190. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See upra notes 154-81 and accompanying text.
191. See upra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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ers to resolve differences in arbitration. Accordingly, no
major section 43(a) claim for mutilation or false attribution,
aside from Follett, has been litigated since Gilliam. However,
there have been several incidents which could have involved
section 43(a) claims had they proceeded to litigation. A brief
review of four such incidents and a discussion of how they
might have been treated follows.
1. Writers
Gore Vidal 19 was hired by Penthouse to write a screenplay
for the film Caligula.194 In exchange, he was to receive a per-
centage of the profits and credit in the form of "Original
Screenplay by Gore Vidal. '1 9 Vidal's script was materially
changed and he therefore sought to have his name removed
from the film. Had he pursued the issue in court he could have
raised two claims which would give rise to section 43(a)
protection.
Vidal could have argued that his work was both mutilated
and falsely attributed to him. Vidal's script was changed and
new material, consisting of hardcore pornographic sex scenes
not included in Vidal's script,"* was added by the director and
producer. After the alteration, the film, containing the graphic
footage, departed substantially from Vidal's script. Unless
Vidal retained an exclusive contractual right to approve all
script changes, it is unlikely that a mutilation claim would be
recognized as the sole basis for bringing a section 43(a)
claim.129
However, a concurrent claim for false attribution under sec-
tion 43(a) would likely have been resolved in Vidal's favor.
Vidal could have argued that he was not the originator of the
192. See, eg., DmwroRs GUnV OF AMEEICA, INC., BASIC AGREEMENT OF 1984, art.
2, § 101, at 15:
The following matters shall be subject to arbitration ... all grievances, dis-
putes or controversies over the interpretation or application of any Em-
ployee's personal services contract or deal memo with respect to... (2)
cutting rights,... (4) creative rights provisions (including, without limitation,
all consultation and/or approval rights of any kind relating to any motion
picture).
193. Gore Vidal is the author of several best selling novels including LINCOLN,
BuRi, and 1876. He has also written short stories, essays, plasm, and film scripts.
194. Penthouse Pictures 1980.
195. Daily Variety, July 12 1979, at 6, col L
196. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1980, § 2, at 17, oOL 4.
197. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
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completed work and that it was injurious to his reputation be-
cause it attributed to him the creation of hardcore porno-
graphic sequences.19' This situation is analogous to Benson v.
Paul Winley Record Corp.,'" where defendant's sale of an al-
tered sound recording as an "X-Rated" album materially mis-
represented the artist's work.
A compromise settlement between Vidal and Penthouse
would be supported by Follett. The actual compromise, as re-
ported in the trade press, resulted in removal of Vidal's name
from the title and changed the credit from "Original Screen-
play by Gore Vidal" to "Adapted From An Original Screenplay
by Gore Vidal. '1 200 As in Follett,2°1 the compromise credit more
accurately represented the creator's contribution to the final
product.
2. Directors
Potential section 43(a) issues frequently arise between a di-
rector and his producer, studio, or distributor. Two areas sub-
ject to dispute are film length and commercial viability. While
the final film usually represents the artistic creativity of the
director, in the business world of film production, artists' moral
rights may be contracted away. They may also come under the
umbrella of the Director's Guild of America Minimum Basic
Agreement, which gives the producer authority over final artis-
tic content.0 2 Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, for a
director to assert complete final artistic control over his film.
However, there is a limited group of directors whose audi-
ence-drawing power and previous commercial success enables
them to negotiate for final artistic control over their films.
The right of artistic control over the film is obtained contractu-
198. Vidal noted that "the actors were signed on the strength of the script and my
name. But now it's been turned into a porno film.... [W]e're talking about basement
pornography." L.A. Times, Sept. 11, 1976, Pt. II, at 7, col. 1.
199. 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying
text.
200. Daily Variety, July 12, 1979, at 6, col. 1.
201. See aupra text following note 138.
202. See DmECroR's GuILD OF AMERICA, INC., MINIMUM BASIC AGREEMENT OF
1984, art. 7, §§ 505 & 1502, at 48 & 51. Section 7-505 refers to the Director's Cut. "The
Director shall prepare the Director's Cut of the film for presentation to the individ-
ual Producer and to the person designated ... as having final cutting authority, in
the ordinary course of business, over the motion picture." Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
Also, § 1500 expressly states, "The Employer's decision in all business and creative
matters shall be final." Id. at 59 (emphasis added).
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ally, but may still be limited in certain respects. Even where a
director may have artistic control over the final cut of a film for
its initial theatrical release, he may not have any right to pro-
tect his work from subsequent editing for television censorship
and time segment requirements, or from studio revisions prior
to a re-release of the film. The director's artistic control may
also be limited by length requirements,' Motion Picture Asso-
ciation of America rating categories, and even by the producer
or studio's subjective determination of the film's commercial
viability.
Three recent disputes in the film industry involving uncon-
sented cutting of a director's film are considered here in light
of section 43(a).
a. Brazil
If anyone is familiar with the application of section 43(a) to
protect a work from mutilation it is former Monty Python
member, Terry Gilliam. Gilliam's recent film Brazil 2 was the
subject of a public tug-of-war between Gilliam and Universal
Studios. As director, Gilliam had final editing rights for a film
that was to be two hours and five minutes in length.m He de-
livered the film at seventeen minutes over the contracted
length. The studio was not pleased with the film or its length
and required Gilliam to renegotiate certain terms of his con-
tract in order to receive a final $4.5 million payment to be paid
by the studio upon delivery of the film.m The renegotiated
terms gave Gilliam the opportunity to re-edit the film to two
hours and twelve minutes.' However, in the renegotiated
contract, Universal gained the right to do any further editing,
regardless of length, if the studio was unhappy with the next
version submitted by Gilliam." Gilliam was later quoted as
having said the renegotiation was necessary because it was like
"a $4.5 million gun held to our heads."2°
203. A director's contract may include a maximum length for the completed film
he is to deliver to the producer or studio. Producers, studios and exhibitors are inter-
ested in presenting films which do not reduce the number of times it can be exhibited
each day because of excessive length, thus maximizing potential sales.
204. Universal City Studios, Inc. 1985.
205. L-A. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, Pt. VI, at 1, col. 1.






Gilliam subsequently delivered a re-edited version of the
film, meeting the renegotiated two hour and twelve minute
length requirement. Universal rejected the newly edited ver-
sion, indicating that it would edit the film with or without Gil-
liam's further assistance.2 10 In the interim, while Gilliam and
Universal continued their public dispute, Gilliam's original
version was released in foreign markets and his two hour and
twelve minute cut of the film received awards for Best Picture,
Director and Screenplay from the Los Angeles Film Critics
Association, whose members saw this version of the film at a
secret screening. 'x As a result of this critical recognition,
Universal fully relented and released Gilliam's re-edited ver-
sion without further editing or studio interference.
Gilliam probably would not have been able to resort to sec-
tion 43(a) if he had pursued this issue in the courts. He clearly
contracted away any right he had in the final product once he
exceeded the two hour and five minute delivery length. In the
renegotiated contract he gave the studio even greater editing
rights based on the studio executives' opinion of the film. Uni-
versal's economic and proprietary rights evidenced by the con-
tract were superior to Gilliam's moral right to maintain the
integrity of his film. Furthermore, courts have required cuts to
be substantial in order to give rise to relief.21 2 In Brazil, how-
ever, the cuts that would have been necessary to reach the
original delivery length were only about eight percent of the
first cut delivered. Although mutilation may result where
small amounts of critical content are edited,2 13 there is no case
support for a successful mutilation claim under section 43(a)
based on the public facts of this case.
b. Reds
Another situation involving unconsented-to cutting, eventu-
ally resolved by an arbitrator in favor of the director, arose
from Warren Beatty's attempt to prohibit American Broad-
210. Id.
211. L.A. Herald Examiner, Dec. 15, 1985, § A, at 1, col. 5.
212. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976) (twenty-
seven percent of film cut); Prem-inger v. Columbia Pictures, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 398,
402 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1966) (referring to mutilation occurring where a film is
cut thirty-three percent from the original).
213. See ifrm notes 214-19 and accompanying text (discussion of Reds, where an
arbitrator found a five per cent cutting inappropriate where the underlying contract
reserved all cutting rights in the director).
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casting Companies (ABC) from cutting a reported six to six-
teen minutes of the film Reds21 4 for television broadcast.
2 15
Beatty claimed that ABC's intended cut significantly altered
the movie and that he alone possessed a final cut right in the
film. ABC claimed that its contract with Paramount Pictures
gave it the right to "cut for broadcast standards."218 These
claims parallel those in Gilliam v. Amercan Broadcasting
Companies, where the plaintiff retained certain rights in the
work. Here, Beatty contractually retained final editing rights
with no apparent provision allowing for television editing other
than for "network continuity broadcast standards"--an appar-
ent reference to airwave censorship. 17 Although the proposed
cuts were only five percent of the film, the arbitrator empha-
sized Beatty's contractual rights. "Beatty... had an absolute
right of final cut that could not be violated by the network ex-
cept for trims of words and images to make the movie more
suitable for showing on television.
'2 18
The decision to prohibit ABC's proposed editing appears to
be grounded on the strength of Beatty's contract, which, by
giving him final cut rights, denied anyone else the right to alter
the work. Thus, Paramount's situation was analogous to that
of the BBC in Gilliam. It could not contract away a television
editing right which it did not possess in the first place.219 This
is, therefore, an example where an arbitrator or court may re-
sort to contract law to protect a director's integrity interest
without having to reach a section 43(a) question.
c. Once Upon A Time In America
The final situation involving unconsented-to cutting presents
a formidable argument on behalf of section 43(a) protection of a
director's film from mutilation. Once Upon A Time In
America m was cut from three hours and forty-seven minutes
214. Paramount Pictures Corp. 1981.
215. L.A. Herald Examiner, Apr. 18, 1985, § C, at 1, col. 5 (quoting Warren Beatty
that "the length of the cuts varied from six to sixteen minutes"); N.Y. Times, Apr. 17,
1985, § C, at 26, col. 1 (reporting nine minutes of proposed cuts); L.A. Times, Apr. 16,
1985, Pt. IV, at 4, col. 1 (noting cuts of ten minutes).
216. L.A. Herald Examiner, Apr. 18,1985, § C, at 1, col. 5 (quoting ABC spokeswo-
man Carol Fleisher).
217. LA. Times, Apr. 18, 1985, Pt. IV, at 1, col. 1.
218. N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 1985, § C, at 26, col. 1.
219. Id.
220. The Ladd Co. 1984.
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to two hours and twenty-four minutes by the Ladd Company,
for whom the film was made.22' Director Sergio Leone had a
contract to deliver a two hour and forty-five minute film but
instead presented to Ladd Company a three hour and forty-
seven minute version.' The length of the film was not eco-
nomically viable for exhibitors or the studio because it could be
shown only once a night while a shorter version could be shown
twice. The studio cut over twenty-seven percent of the film,
releasing a two hour and twenty-four minute version. When
critics and audiences compared both versions, the consensus
was that the original film had been mutilated. M
Although these facts appear to give rise to a section 43(a)
claim for mutilation, a court might be limited by the contract
provision calling for delivery of a two hour and forty-five min-
ute final cut. Even with a finding of blatant mutilation, a court
is unlikely to enjoin a studio from commercially exploiting a
multi-million dollar investment where the director knowingly
contracted away his integrity interest, and breached express
provisions of his contract by delivering a film which exceeded
maximum permissible length.
Leone's other interests in the work, such as his participation
as a screenwriter, might create support for some form of relief
under section 43(a). However, a court relying on Gilliam
might find Leone's contractual obligation to deliver a two hour
and forty-five minute director's cut overriding. Nevertheless,
if the editing amounts to mutilation, a court could find that the
221. The Long and Short of It, TIME, June 18, 1984, at 82.
222. Id.
223. Critical response to the effect of the cuts is best expressed by film critics Vin-
cent Canby of the New York Times and Pauline Kael of THE NEW YoRKER
What happened to 'Once Upon A Time In America' in its initial release
here shouldn't happen to a cheap roast beef. It wasn't carved up-it was
pulled to pieces by someone's bare greedy hands. ... [ilts nearly four hour
form... seems about half as long as the shorter version.... Because of the
manner in which it had been edited-read "butchered"-the narrative made
little sense and the performances seemed... irrational.
Canby, The Festival Makes a Potent Case for Preservation, Sunday N.Y. Times, Oct.
21, 1984, § H (Arts and Leisure) at 23, col. 1, 2;
When Sergio Leone's epic "Once Upon A Time In America" opened here
in June, 1984, in a studio-hacked-down version .... it seemed so incoher-
ently bed that I didn't see how the full-length film could be anything but
longer. A few weeks later, though, the studio people let me take a look at it,
and I was amazed at the difference. I don't believe I've ever seen a worse
case of mutilation.
Kael, The Cunmnt Cinema Tidal, THE NEW YoRKm, May 27, 1985, at 82.
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Ladd Company's version was not Leone's creation. If so, public
distribution of the film and the attendant publicity attributing
direction of the film to Leone would misrepresent the film's
origin to the public. Under this analysis, the combined effect
of mutilation and false attribution might give rise to a compro-
mise section 43(a) remedy. A compromise remedy might con-
sist of providing an appropriate disclaimer in the film credits,
advertising, and publicity, or removing Leone's name entirely
from the title, credits, and publicity.
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the legal bases for protecting moral
rights in America. Since the United States does not recognize
the European doctrine of droit moral per se, the courts have
resorted to different legal theories to preserve the creator's
moral interest in his work. A number of early cases based such
protection on common law unfair competition.2 ' . Since 1946,
several artists have sought to protect their works under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act. 2
Review of existing case law indicates that only the moral
right of paternity has been embraced by courts through section
43(a) protection. An artist's right not to have his work misat-
tributed is accepted and substantiated through cases such as
Granz, Geisel, Rich, and Follett. However, the moral right of
integrity has not fared as well. While an artist's integrity rights
can be protected by contract, legal precedent for applying
section 43(a), primarily provided by Gilliam v. American
Broadcasting Companies, is not strong. Absent contractual
protection, the moral right of integrity might be protected by
courts through section 43(a) on a finding of blatant mutilation
resulting in false attribution, such as that which occurred in
Once Upon A Time In America and Monty Python's Flying
Circus.
224. See International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), dis-
cussed supra notes 28-40 and accompanying text. See also Prouty v. National Broad-
casting Co., 26 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1938), discussed supra notes 41-49 and
accompanying text.
225. See Autry v. Republic Prods., Inc., 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954), discussed
supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. See also Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 283
F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), discussed eupra notes 84-100 and accompanying text.
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